

m. 10.

Box 85

The  
Story  
of

U. N. R. R. A.

"I think it is worth calling the attention of the House again to the tremendous work in connection with UNRRA. What sort of Europe we should have had without UNRRA, I really do not know: It is too horrible to contemplate. I think it would have been swept with epidemics. Everybody had a share of UNRRA including Soviet Russia and the Eastern states—everybody—and that cost the United States pounds sterling 675 million (\$2,700,000,000), Canada pounds sterling 35 million (\$138,738,000) and it cost this country, even in our impoverished condition, pounds sterling 155 million (\$624,650,000). It was an event which stemmed the horrible disease we had following the 1914-18 war which most have forgotten."

From Address by Ernest Bevin,  
Secretary of State for Foreign  
Affairs, before House of Com-  
mons, London, January 14, 1948.

## FOREWORD

This is "The Story of UNRRA". It is not the full story—that will be told much later when the official history comes to be written—but it is UNRRA in essence and is designed to tell how relief and rehabilitation was administered in the difficult, immediate post-war years to suffering humanity in Europe and the Far East. Vast areas of the world had been devastated and millions were without food and shelter. Millions cried out for help in their pitiable condition of hunger and despair . . . that cry did not go unheeded. Governments of more fortunate nations, representing the deep feeling of their peoples, worked out plans to alleviate hunger and overcome despair. Thus, out of good-neighborliness and good-will, and in fulfillment of pledges given during the war, UNRRA was born.

We—the staff of UNRRA (and I speak, too, for the many hundreds who have already dispersed)—have been deeply conscious of the responsibility we bore. We knew it as a trust, not only to the peoples we had the responsibility to help, but also to the peoples who made that help possible. We counted it a privilege to carry out that trust and tried conscientiously to do so. We looked on ourselves as a "fighting unit"—for we fought against starvation; we fought against disease—and we fought against time. In our struggle for victory we had to combat shortages of all kinds—food, fuel, machinery—and when we had found these things, we had to combat lack of shipping to carry them where they were needed. And it was the determination of the contributing peoples to see these difficulties overcome, and the steady cooperation of the receiving peoples to see their lands recover, which enabled us to conquer the setbacks and to achieve our aim.

Every citizen in every contributing country is entitled to have an account of our stewardship. I know, too, that my predecessors—Governor Herbert H. Lehman who built so well a functioning agency out of an official document, and Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia who followed him (and whose untimely death occurred last year)—I know that these two men would wish this account of our work to be available to citizens the world over, so that they may derive a better understanding of what we set out to do in their name and what was finally accomplished. It is hoped that the reader will find the significant answers to his questions in this—"The Story of UNRRA."

*Lowell W. Rooks*

Director General

Feb. 15, 1948

With one victory shaping up on the battlefields, the United Nations banded together in UNRRA to win another victory in peace --- A VICTORY OVER . . .



*homelessness . . .*



*hunger . . .*

ON November 9, 1943, representatives of forty-four nations gathered around a table at the White House in Washington. That morning's headlines were fresh in their minds:

"JAP PLANES DESTROYED AT RABAU"

"ALLIES ADVANCE IN ITALY"

"RUSSIANS NEAR POLISH BORDER"

Allied victory in Europe and the Far East was slowly emerging. The fate of millions of human beings in occupied lands rode with each Allied tank and each Allied plane. Every mile of countryside recaptured from the Axis, every village and town liberated, gave them assurance that they, too, would some day be free.

But the fate of these millions lay just as surely on that White House conference table. The document which was signed there established the first international relief agency in world history—the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

UNRRA, as it came to be known, was a promise to the invaded lands and their people who were fighting for the common cause by sabotage—in the hills, underground—that once the aggressor's yoke had been lifted, the uninvaded lands would pool their resources to send food and medicines and clothing and other emergency supplies.

In 1944, UNRRA was an affirmation to those waiting behind German and Japanese lines that they had not been forgotten.

In 1945 and 1946 and 1947 it was life itself to untold numbers of them.

The full impact of UNRRA assistance on the seventeen war-warped countries in which the giant agency worked cannot be estimated until some time in the future—if then. For UNRRA locomotives will be pulling their burden of box cars down the rails, and UNRRA tractors will be drawing plows through the fields for some years to come. And by what device can the world ever measure the increased strength, the increased spirit that UNRRA food gave to hungry men and nations struggling to face up to their mighty reconstruction tasks?

But it is not too soon to be sure of these three things:

UNRRA prevented widespread starvation.

UNRRA curbed sweeping epidemics.

UNRRA averted economic collapse.

In so doing it gave the world a breathing spell in the struggle for recovery. And it put down the first stones upon which that recovery can be built.

UNRRA also did something else. Because its job was to act, rather than to deliberate or study, it was the first great international agency to go out into the world and wrestle with the problems that arrived with the peace. It was a global approach to a global problem. And it proved that an operating agency depending upon international cooperation can function efficiently and effectively.

Its way was not easy. When its course was chartered, the Allies were united by the overpowering objective of winning the war. UNRRA had to hold to that course despite the stresses and strains in international relations that gathered and grew with the peace. It had, in short, to operate a one-world agency in a world that was threatening to dissolve into two.

Yet despite this and other hurdles, UNRRA did the job it was set up to do. It did it swiftly. Only time will tell how well, and with what lasting effect.

## Horizons Limited

When the representatives of the forty-four nations sat down to thresh out a pattern for UNRRA, the outlines of the relief and rehabilitation task ahead were still blurred. Most of the invaded lands of both Europe and the Far East were completely blacked out.

The ragged, disease-ridden, hungry men, women and children who had escaped across the Mediterranean from southern Europe and had been gathered up to be cared for in the Middle East refugee camps which UNRRA administered gave the world a sickening close-up of what was happening to human beings in the invaded lands.

Allied intelligence indicated that in the bombed and bloody battleground countries whole cities were being pulverized, transportation wrecked, public utilities shattered. And at that time, the war had—well, no one knew how many more months or years to go.

UNRRA's approach was to put first things first. First things in any devastated area are food and clothing and shelter and medicine, for together they spell the difference between life and death for a man, a village, a town, or a country. And these things were the essence of the initial "R", the "R" for Relief.

The other "R", the "R" for Rehabilitation, had, in every way, to come second. Even with resources ultimately totaling more than the three billion dollars, UNRRA could not hope to "restore" the economy of a country that had been through years of war. It couldn't even hope to "restore" transportation or public utilities or communications or mines or ports or factories to their pre-war levels or conditions. Instead UNRRA chose to make its rehabilitation target just this: To put back into running order those segments of a nation's economy which were necessary to carry out the relief program, and to give each country and its people some of the tools to begin to help themselves.

UNRRA relief and rehabilitation were therefore interlocked and interdependent. Without UNRRA bulldozers to repair the roads, and UNRRA equipment to rebuild the bridges; without UNRRA trucks and UNRRA freight cars to roll down the repaired roads and rails, its supplies would have reached only a handful of those in need, and it would have been little more than a soup kitchen in the port cities.

But when starvation threatened, and then threatened again in country after country, UNRRA had to cut into some of its rehabilitation funds for some items to send food, and more food and still more food. First things had to come first.

This then was the sum total of UNRRA's objective:

Get to the people the essentials to keep them alive, and then give to them some of the means to begin to pull themselves up by other than their own bootstraps. And, finally, and to as

vast an extent as possible, give them some of the boots as well.

#### FOR THE HAVE-NOTS

Thus limiting its objectives, the Administration then limited its scope. It was obvious that there would be world-wide shortages of both relief and rehabilitation supplies at the war's end, and that many nations would be scrambling for them. UNRRA accepted the challenge of making sure that those nations which had no foreign exchange, and therefore could not bid—and outbid—for these supplies in a tight world market, would receive a large enough share to head off complete disaster.

At first the recipient countries were limited to the invaded United Nations with no foreign exchange. Later on, several ex-enemy lands, whose people had been unwillingly associated with the Axis, were added.

The countries which were given general relief and rehabilitation assistance during all or part of the life span of UNRRA were: Albania, Austria, Byelorussia, China, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Greece, Poland, the Ukraine and Yugoslavia. Those which received limited aid—that is food, clothing, medicine, and other life-saving supplies were: Ethiopia, Finland, Hungary, Korea, the Philippine Islands, and the Dodecanese Islands and the small Republic of San Marino.

The invaded lands in western Europe possessed adequate foreign exchange at the end of the war, and did not ask UNRRA for aid. Small amounts of emergency supplies were sent into Normandy, the low countries, Luxembourg and Norway in the immediate post-war months, financed from a special fund.

And all invaded countries of western Europe were given huge quantities of clothing raised in the UNRRA-sponsored United National and Victory Clothing Collections. This clothing likewise went to other invaded lands around the world.

#### What and How

It is difficult to understand what UNRRA did—and how—without a clear picture of its organizational mechanism. When its aims were blueprinted, forty-four

United Nations subscribed to them. That number swelled to forty-eight before its work was done.

UNRRA was, then, the operating agency of forty-eight member governments. Each of these governments participated in its policy-making Council. During the life of UNRRA this Council met six times, twice in Atlantic City, New Jersey, once in Washington, D. C., once in Montreal, Canada, and once in London and in Geneva.

Representatives of nine governments composed a Central Committee which made emergency decisions between Council sessions. They were a cross-section of the forty-eight member governments. Five of them, a majority, were the principal supplying countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Brazil. Two were invaded countries: the Soviet Union, which did not ask for assistance, though the two most devastated Soviet republics did; and France. The remaining two were invaded lands which did receive relief: China and Yugoslavia. The Central Committee met at the Washington Headquarters of UNRRA upon call of the chairman.

The executive responsibility was centered in a Director General, who was assisted by his staff. All three of the Directors General were citizens of the United States: Former Governor Herbert H. Lehman of New York, the late F. H. LaGuardia of New York, and Major General Lowell W. Rooks.

#### KNOW-HOW BY EXPERTS

The staff itself was both multi-national and multi-lingual. At its peak it totaled over 12,000 people scattered around the globe, a figure which does not include local employees. The largest concentrations were in the Washington Headquarters and in the European Regional Office in London, with smaller concentrations in the Missions of the receiving countries, in the liaison Missions in the supplying countries, and in the displaced persons camps and assembly centers in Germany, Austria, Italy, the Middle East and China.

There were forty nations represented on this staff, a great body of international civil servants. Many of them were experts with global reputations—and these

experts were the backbone of UNRRA. For you can't just stride into Europe or any other continent, with loads of goods and services, before knowing what is wanted, or where you can get it, or without finding qualified technicians to take charge—specialists in administration, procurement, agriculture, transportation, civil engineering, industrial engineering, public health and medicine, social welfare, finance, accounting, communications, aerial transport, plastic surgery.

Naturally, since it was a pioneer organization doing a job of a scope and significance new to history, UNRRA had no background of tradition, system, language or currency. There were no sign posts along the way. It had to learn by doing. Such conditions are not conducive to swift action, especially in international business where the tempo has always been slow.

But UNRRA had to move quickly. Want will not wait. And UNRRA did succeed in getting its life-saving supplies into the receiving countries—and in time. That it was able to do this was probably due to three main reasons:

(1) Its international staff was imbued with a common loyalty. Only those who believed intensely in its objectives were willing to undergo the rigorous schedules and living conditions of many of its field posts.

(2) A very large measure of executive responsibility was conferred on the Director General. His relationship to the Council was rather like that of a general manager to his board of directors. Within the bounds of established policy, there was an elasticity at the center of the operations. There was control, of course, but not too many strings attached to that control.

(3) There was a wide delegation of authority. It extended through the whole of the field organization—to the Missions in each of the receiving countries, to the supply Missions stretching around the globe, and even to a welfare team searching for Allied children who had been stolen and hidden in German homes. A child was often discovered solely because of the initiative and the ingenuity of a dogged worker in an UNRRA uniform.

Although scattered far and wide, UNRRA was a close-knit organization, with each Mission in frequent cable

A VICTORY OVER . . .

*raggedness  
and cold . .*



*enforced exile . . .*

*despair . . .*



and telephone communication with Washington headquarters or the European Regional Office, and with officials often in the field to confer and review. One senior official, for example, traveled more than 200,000 miles in two and one-half years, or a distance equal to eight trips around the world.

### Dollars and Drachmas

UNRRA was financed by its member governments. Each member government which had not been occupied by the enemy was asked to contribute two per cent of its national income for relief supplies and services; and all countries, invaded or uninvaded, to contribute proportionately to the expenses of running the agency. Thirteen non-member governments, and private persons and voluntary agencies in many, many countries were moved to give money, or supplies, or services.

The three largest governmental contributors\* were: The United States, \$2,700,000,000 (or about 70%); United Kingdom, \$624,650,000; and Canada \$138,738,739.

The fact that UNRRA drew its financial support from so many nations meant that its finance officials and accountants had to handle and keep records in terms not only of British sterling or American dollars, but also of French francs, Yugoslav dinar, Italian lire, Allied marks, Greek drachmas, Egyptian piastres, Maria Theresa dollars, and many others. In all, over seventy-five different currencies were entered on the UNRRA ledger.

One of the baffling problems in handling these numerous currencies was estimating the rate of exchange. Exchange rates and values of some of the currencies fluctuated frequently and violently. There was a period in one of the countries when the price of a meal varied while it was being eaten.

Less than ten per cent of the Administration's total financial resources were in cash. Instead, most member governments made their contribution available in the form of commodity credits. In some cases, the commodities offered were not necessarily what UNRRA asked for or would have bought if given a free hand. For this reason a few luxury and other items not really essential to relief showed up in receiving countries.

The commodity credit system made the UNRRA supply program a post-war boon to commerce and industry of the heavily contributing countries, especially the U. S., and used up surpluses for which there would otherwise probably have been no market at the moment. The supplies were bitterly needed—but who could have bought them?

### **“Emergency—Rush”**

The heart of UNRRA was its supply and shipping program. In fulfilling this program it became a huge business enterprise. At its peak, it was the largest export-import concern, aside from a few governments, the world has ever known. The agency bought three billion dollars worth of food and equipment, and packed, recorded and shipped them. The details of its transactions stretched out around the globe.

UNRRA was also the largest peace-time shipping business in history. The first full UNRRA cargo ship sailed in March, 1945. When the last boat leaves for China, probably some time early in 1948, UNRRA will have shipped over twenty-five million long tons of goods. This is more than three times post-World War I relief.

A map of the globe, marked with lines of UNRRA shipments, by land and by sea, from contributing countries to ultimate consignment in receiving countries, would show every ocean and continent criss-crossed with a vast series of transportation webs exceeded in extent and intricacy only by military shipments during the war.

If the more than 6,000 ships that carried UNRRA cargoes were massed at one time in New York harbor, and then sailed out to sea one by one in convoy formation, it would take them over three full days and nights to pass Ambrose Light. The largest number would be flying the U. S. flag, and would be recognized immediately by any sea-going American as war-built Liberty's and Victory's. Second in registry would be British vessels, and third, Canadian, with practically all of the other contributing nations represented.


UNRRA's transport lines originated in every conceivable source of contributed foods, raw materials and finished goods. They moved by rivers, canals, railroads and highways to scores of ports in the supplying countries;

TO WIN THIS VICTORY . . .



*the nations that composed UNRRA chose an American,  
Herbert H. Lehman, as Director General . . .*

*then succeeded him by the  
late F. H. La Guardia . . .*



*and, in January, 1947, by Major  
General Lowell W. Rooks . . .*

thence out across oceans and seas to the ports of the receiving countries; and, finally, by broken waterways, railroads and highways down to the people who needed them. Almost every uninvaded nation, and some of those that were invaded, contributed.

The manifests of UNRRA ships read like huge mail order catalogues. Hundreds of thousands of separate items were carried. They ranged all the way from needles to locomotives and freight cars. From sulphadiazine tablets to X-ray machines and 1,000-bed hospital units. From seeds and small hand tools to threshing machines. From scissors and burlap bags to fishing boats.

Hatching eggs and medicines and tractor belts were sent by air, and entire ships were loaded with livestock or coal or wheat.

There never was an undertaking quite like it before . . .

And almost every single item was tagged "Emergency—Rush" . . .

### Shortages . . Shortages . . Shortages

When the first UNRRA ship sailed with a relief cargo for Czechoslovakia and Poland, the Russians were well into Eastern Germany. V-E Day was two months away; V-J Day, six months.

During all of the early days when UNRRA was striving to get supplies into the war-devastated countries, or the parts of them that had been liberated, it had to compete with the military for both supplies and ships. The needs of the military, naturally, had to come first. There was a shortage of everything, even of port facilities both in this country and overseas.

With the war's end, there was demobilization, and the fact that the millions of men who could not be immediately brought home still had to be fed and housed. And still shortages—shortages of manufactured goods, of medical supplies, of essential foods and of ships.

It was not until late in 1945 that UNRRA was able to get all of the bottoms it required. And because of delays in procurement, its shipping program to Europe, originally scheduled to end in December, 1946, slipped well over into 1947, with a few tag-ends still arriving in 1948.

Using all the estimates on post-war requirements made by organizations and governments, UNRRA began very soon after it was established to bid for a share of key relief supplies from the inter-governmental allocating authorities which had the say about them, and to stockpile those supplies against the day they could be given to those who needed them.

Then, on the heels of the retreating Axis, UNRRA moved into country after country to make on-the-spot surveys of damage, and to supervise the use of the emergency supplies that began arriving. Eventually over-all estimates of both relief and rehabilitation needs were worked out by the government of each country itself, with UNRRA's assistance, and comparative budgets set. Every program, however, was constantly subject to the acid test of review, and changed as circumstances warranted.

Seldom, in its years of operation, was UNRRA able to get enough of many of the commodities the countries were pleading for. In the first place, it had no sovereignty. Most of its procurement was done by national government agencies. (In the U.S.: Treasury Department, Department of Agriculture, etc. In the United Kingdom: Ministry of Supply and The Board of Trade. In Canada: Canadian Commercial Corporation.)

Again, it had to depend on legislative action by various member governments for its funds. A delay in legislative action sent the best-laid procurement plans awry.

It was subject to the vagaries of the changing international political scene.

On more than one occasion prompt delivery of some of its commodities was delayed by strikes.

Yet it fulfilled its supply program—that three billion dollar program which totaled more than twenty-five million long tons—to within one-half of one per cent of its promises to the plundered nations and their peoples.

### **At the End of Ship's Tackle**

The responsibility for speeding supplies from the ends of the earth down to the humblest peasant living under the rubble of his home—and speeding them there in time—was a divided one. UNRRA performed the first

part of the task; the receiving government, with UNRRA as a consultant and observer, the second part. Together, they formed a great international life line.

The supplies became the property of each government at the end of the ship's tackle, or at their border town of entry if they went in by land. It was the government's responsibility to see that they reached the people who were depending on them, with UNRRA standing by to observe their use and distribution.

In some countries, naturally, distribution was better than in others. Much depended upon the stability of the government in power. In one receiving country, Greece, UNRRA had to deal with nine different governments during the time its Mission was in operation. Almost every change in government meant a slow down in distribution while the new ministers and UNRRA officials worked out operation agreements and techniques. In a second, China, a civil war hampered operations.

Another distribution difficulty was lack of inland transportation. Sometimes supplies stood for considerable periods in dockside warehouses before they could be got moving.

But the great bulk of UNRRA food and equipment went almost immediately and directly down to those for whom they were intended—the common people.

In spite of the occasional misuse of UNRRA supplies that came to light, the Administration is convinced that government distribution was far more desirable than UNRRA distribution. The heavy overhead of providing enough distribution agents to handle UNRRA's huge imports would have cut deeply into their total. Salaries for these agents would have meant fewer loaves of bread for the starving. And as it was, reports of leakages and abuses were investigated by the distribution observers attached to each Mission . . . and rectified.

The black market—which is a frequent by-product of acute shortages, even in the best-organized lands—flourished in some of the war-tumbled countries UNRRA assisted. UNRRA officials watched closely, day-by-day,

to make sure that no appreciable part of their relief supplies appeared in these markets. And, in the main, they did not.

It is not generally understood that UNRRA, in some instances, concurred in the sale of certain luxury goods in the open market. Cigarettes, for example, which were an integral part of the immense stocks of surplus army ration packs that UNRRA purchased.

Also some items identified as UNRRA imports showed up in black markets in this way: Individuals, or institutions, would trade an item received from UNRRA for something else UNRRA did not handle. Or they would exchange an UNRRA item which was in great demand, and therefore highly priced, for several items that were cheaper. A larger quantity of more sustaining foods, perhaps. But these trade-ins never occurred in substantial numbers.

#### AN UNRRA LEGACY

One of the first resolutions adopted at the first Council session provided that all UNRRA supplies should be distributed within a country without regard to politics, race or religion. The Administration worked unceasingly to carry out this policy to the letter. It took seriously any report which indicated any degree of discrimination—even unsupported allegations made in a news story or a magazine article—and dispatched trained observers to ferret out the truth.

In the case of Yugoslavia, where it was charged that UNRRA supplies were being used (1) as a political weapon, and (2) to clothe and transport the Yugoslav army, the Administration sent in a special three-man mission to investigate. It was composed of a British Army officer who was Chief of Supply Planning in the Balkan Command; a high French government official who had been Director of Judicial Affairs in General De Gaulle's Department of Justice; and a citizen of the United States who had been advisor in capitol budgeting to the Governor of Virginia. They were assisted by almost the entire Mission staff:

Their report: Misuse of UNRRA supplies in Yugoslavia was negligible, and confined to local, isolated cases.

No evidence whatsoever that any substantial quantities of goods had been diverted to the Yugoslav army. Without reservation, most of the supplies were being efficiently distributed to all the people.

The Administration is confident that with the exception of China, where a civil war made distribution to all parts of the country and all people physically impossible, **all but a trickle of its tremendous supplies were distributed without discrimination.**

Another early decision of the United Nations composing UNRRA was that relief supplies could be sold by a receiving government as well as given away. The reasoning behind the decision was a combination of the humanitarian and the practical. It was a basic UNRRA concept that all relief supplies essential to existence should be given without charge to anyone in distress who could not afford to pay for them.

But for the most part the people were able to pay in local currency; it was foreign exchange that was lacking. And where the people could pay it was better for the economy of the country that they should.

Also, the bankrupt countries gravely needed more local currency in their own treasuries so they could put their battered health, welfare, and other services to the people back into running order. Only then could they squeeze the most out of the UNRRA supplies.

In addition, the countries had to have money to finance the UNRRA Missions in their capital cities—to give them buildings to work in and live in and to provide the necessary clerical help it was too expensive to import.

And finally it was important that no country disrupt its economic system, or its price structure—both already badly shaken by war—by throwing vast quantities of free goods on the market.

Agreements between the receiving governments and UNRRA, therefore, provided that supplies unused for direct relief should go into normal channels of trade, or into state-owned stores, for sale, with the proceeds to be put into a sort of revolving fund and plowed back into further relief and rehabilitation work until every UNRRA

penny had bought the most it could. Most of the rehabilitation supplies were likewise sold, or swung into cooperative use, by the government.

Thus the money which assisted countries took in from the sale of UNRRA goods is today a legacy which, for years, will continue to bring benefits to the people. In Italy, for example, this legacy totals close to eighty-five billion lire, and a five-year plan has been outlined for its use. Among the projects it is making possible are rehousing the bombed-out families of Naples, the continuation of UNRRA's anti-malarial, anti-tuberculosis and anti-trachoma campaigns, and of its special child feeding programs.

The "Lire Fund" is one of the factors which will enable Italy to continue her progress toward economic stability—and one of the reasons why the full impact of UNRRA's assistance cannot yet be measured.

### No Mass Starvation

Almost half of the money UNRRA spent, and much more than half of its procurement time, went into food. There is no doubt that this food saved millions of lives. From the governments of the invaded nations, and from the people themselves, has come again and again the simple statement that they could not have gotten through the first two hard post-war years without it.

Nutritionists of wide reputation say that three specific famines which seemed almost inevitable were averted by UNRRA: one in urban Austria, and one each in rural Yugoslavia and rural Greece.

But though actual starvation on a wide scale was prevented in Europe, acute hunger was not. Great pools of human beings have had barely enough food to live on for years. Under-feeding, and the diseases that mushroom with it, spreads out across Europe and the Far East like a mantle.

Food—and more food—was the request of the receiving countries. And food—and more food—was UNRRA's procurement quest. Drought and unexpected slowness in rehabilitating local agriculture cut down indigenous production in one country after another. These coun-

tries were forced to revise their estimates of most pressing needs and then to revise them again, to include more food, often at the expense of agricultural equipment which would have helped increase the yield of the local soil. More than once seeds sent in for planting had to be used to keep human beings alive. Ground was lost in the battle against starvation and then gained again.

UNRRA's headache word was "non-availability". Spelled out it meant many things. For instance, an international allocating authority would assign a certain portion of a commodity in short supply to UNRRA. That allocation was simply a "hunting license". UNRRA had to find and buy the commodity from the supplying country in accord with the allocation. Usually it had then to be procured through another agency. All of this took time. And often there was no "game" at all.

As a result there were many tight squeezes and dramatic incidents in getting supplies to a needy country. During emergency periods, UNRRA shipping was on a tailor-made basis. Frequently a wireless was flashed to a ship in mid-ocean directing it to change destination as food stocks dipped lower in one country than in another.

In the spring of 1947, it became obvious that the food UNRRA was sending into Austria, Poland and Greece would not stretch until the harvest. (UNRRA's entire 1947 program was merely a slip-over of supplies which could not be delivered in 1946 because of procurement and shipping hurdles.) To tide these countries over until they could get assistance from some other source, the Administration switched thirty-five million dollars into an emergency food fund. Many lives were unquestionably saved by this measure.

#### BREAD FOR MILLIONS

The bulk of the food procured was bread grains, since they are the staff of life in many parts of the world. They can be refined into flour for spaghetti, or black bread, or any other customary food. The total UNRRA bread grain shipments was truly staggering. They would have baked five one-pound loaves of bread for every man, woman and child in the world. Bread grains went into

every receiving country, except the Russian republics, where grain was not needed. Even China received wheat and corn when rice could not be procured.

Other UNRRA foods were likewise chosen for their nutritive value: fats and oils, dairy products, peas, beans, sugar, canned and powdered milk and many other types of simple foods that would ship easily and not spoil. Most of them were dehydrated or in some other compact form that took little space.

The meat UNRRA procured was primarily canned, and included blood sausage, horse meat, lunch cuts, tushonka, vegetable stews and hashes and similar meat products. The supplying countries did not forego a single steak or roast or lamb chop because of UNRRA's purchases.

UNRRA was also the U. S. Quartermaster's best post-war customer. At the war's end, the Administration purchased a substantial amount of the surplus food stocks stacked up around the world.

#### A GOOD BARGAIN

It was a good bargain for everyone. UNRRA needed the food to ship immediately into areas of want. The Quartermaster had on his hands huge quantities of food unsuitably packaged for the American market, which would have spoiled if left in hot, humid warehouses. And the men, women and children in the UNRRA countries received many highly nutritious items ordinarily too expensive for relief feeding.

UNRRA purchased other food supplies intended for fighting men from the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia—notably in the Balkan, North African and South Pacific stockpiles.

All of these surplus army supplies, as well as the other UNRRA supplies, were plainly marked as to the country of their origin. Cans and packages and sacks of goods handed out for relief feeding, and placed in rows in stores for sale, were labeled not only with the country from which they came, but usually with the name of the firm that packed them. Just as are the cans and packages and sacks that are sold in stores the world over:

To the neediest of liberated lands, and their people, UNRRA brought . . .





*food,  
and more food,  
and still more food.*

*clothing to exchange for  
their rags . . .*



*medical supplies  
and services . . .*

The people knew where the supplies that were saving their lives came from **BY THE LABELS . . .**



*on cans . . . on sacks . . .*



## No Widespread Epidemics

After the first World War one epidemic after another swept the broken countries of Europe. World War II made that first world war look like a backyard fist fight. An UNRRA medical officer, who arrived in Poland in the summer of 1945, took one long look and then wrote home:

"So this is Warsaw. I don't believe it. They couldn't tear up a place like this. Health and sanitation facilities are completely disrupted. There are no sheets—patients lie in straw. Many doctors have no instruments at all.

"Twenty-seven babies out of every 100 die before they reach the age of one year. In some sections, fifty babies out of every 100 never celebrate their first birthday!"

A dozen potential epidemics simmered under the rubble of every bombed city. Millions of refugees were on the march. People everywhere were underfed and cold and dirty—an easy prey to disease.

Yet no runaway epidemics surged out across Europe, and only one disease, cholera, reached epidemic proportions in the Far East before it was curbed.

The achievement was the result of a happy triumvirate; the new methods developed by medical science between the wars, and their bold and immediate use, first by the Allied armies in the villages and towns they liberated, and later, and on a widespread scale by UNRRA in thirteen of the world's most disorganized and devastated invaded lands.

UNRRA's highly trained medical staff and its mountains of medical supplies together comprised the largest international health program the world has ever known.

The health staff counseled, organized and assisted the governments. Only in the D. P. camps did UNRRA doctors and nurses diagnose, prescribe and give bedside care. In the invaded lands their main business was to set prostrate health departments on their feet so there would be machinery in each country through which health measures could be launched.

The most immediate and formidable epidemic threat in many of the liberated countries was louse-born typhus. In Europe, almost stripped of soap and the fats to make it, an uncontrolled blaze-up of typhus could have swept

the continent. UNRRA-imported DDT powder, a new type of dusting gun, and a streamlined technique which made it unnecessary for the dustee to undress were all put to work. A single dusting required about two minutes, and two ounces of powder, and the dustee was deloused for two weeks. Then it was repeated again. After World War I typhus took thousands of lives in central Europe. This time it was stopped dead in its tracks.

#### MALARIA CONTROLLED

Another UNRRA campaign reduced malaria, Greece's greatest debilitator, to its lowest incidence in modern history. The weapons used were ten airplanes which swooped low over malarial mosquito-breeding grounds emitting a fog of DDT, and hand sprays which, village-by-village, spread a DDT solution over the walls of out-houses and homes. The method was simple, low in cost, and the results it produced were just short of miraculous. In Italy, UNRRA sanitary engineers directed a hand-spray attack which by itself reduced the number of malaria cases in the provinces in which it was tried.

UNRRA's experience in Greece and Italy seems to prove that—at long last—it has become both practical and economical to control the ancient scourge of malaria on a nation-wide scale.

Other epidemic diseases spurted up in invaded countries, but never got out of hand. UNRRA flew remedial drugs and equipment into troubled spots as they appeared. The absence of influenza in its virulent form was a stroke of luck, because medical scientists say frankly that if flu of the virulence and velocity of the 1919 culprit had got a toe hold anywhere it would have been hard to stop.

On the other side of the world, in China, where cholera is endemic, and expands every spring and summer, an epidemic developed in 1946. Control supplies were rushed by air from Dayton, Ohio, across the Pacific to Shanghai. The wave was broken earlier than expected, and many lives were saved.

UNRRA continued to amass supplies in anticipation of cholera's 1947 bow, and to direct preventive meas-

ures. It likewise stepped up its shipments of the raw materials and equipment to manufacture anti-cholera products.

The disease never got out of hand in China in 1947. And when the serious cholera epidemic broke out in Egypt in the fall, threatening that country and surrounding lands, the Chinese government was able to offer many tons of cholera vaccine made with UNRRA equipment to the stricken Mediterranean area.

The medical supplies and their expert use were not the only factors in epidemic control. The epidemiological information network was also vastly important. This service is a sort of international "weather bureau" whereby incipient epidemics can be spotted and charted like a hurricane, and health bureaus around the world notified. The epidemiological cables and bulletins contain official information transmitted under the International Sanitary Conventions for Maritime and Aerial Navigation. Before the war the conventions were administered from Paris, but with the Nazi occupation, the work almost ceased.

In January, 1945, UNRRA, as the international health organization to bridge the war-caused hiatus in health work, took over the administration of these conventions, brought them up to date, and issued reports and cables regularly. They were turned over to the Interim Commission of the World Health Organization late in 1946.

### **Immediate Present vs. Long-range Future**

No widespread starvation. No runaway epidemics. Two news stories the world had every right and reason to expect would be splashed across the front pages of its papers in the first disorganized months and years after the most destructive war in history. Two news stories that did not have to be written.

The UNRRA supplies and services which were catapulted into the immediate and urgent present did their immediate and urgent job. But these supplies and services, together with many definitely labeled "long-range", are stretching a strong arm into the future as well.

For instance, no UNRRA technician ever worked in a vacuum, but rather with one or more of his professional counterparts in the assisted country at his side to see what he did and why. All warring nations were desperately short of technicians of all types. Much of the new equipment and many of the products were unfamiliar to those blacked out from advances made during the war. UNRRA specialists tried to impart to those who would take over when UNRRA pulled out as much of their own up-to-date training and experience as possible.

The six hundred women who went out as UNRRA nurses are examples of the UNRRA long-range approach. Many of them were public health consultants—top women in their profession. They did little actual nursing, except in the D.P. camps, and on homeward bound trips with refugees, but rather attacked the nub of the nursing problem everywhere which was to provide permanent machinery to train more and better nurses, and at a gallop.

So they helped reorganize hospitals and nursing schools, taught in the schools, gave refresher courses, instructed nurses' aides, and even translated recognized textbooks into the language of the assisted countries. To supplement their work UNRRA brought some 100 carefully chosen European and Chinese graduate nurses to England and the United States for four-month review courses.

The problems faced by the UNRRA nurses were indicative of the titanic and tough assignment UNRRA had as a whole.

When the first UNRRA nurse arrived in Greece on the heels of the retreating Nazis, the initial hospital she was asked to help reorganize and put back on a more efficient basis had over 2,000 beds, all filled, and only twenty trained nurses. And practically no equipment or pharmaceuticals.

Another UNRRA nurse traveled for four weeks by boat, by jeep and by donkey-back, to conduct a refresher course for Chinese nurses in Chui-hsien, only to find the hospital had been evacuated to peasants' huts in the mountains to escape the cross-fire of the civil war. It had not a single thermometer or scalpel, only one obstetrical forceps, and almost no surgical instruments. Some

of the 125 pupils had come 100 miles by horseback. Classes were conducted for exactly one week, and then everybody was ordered to evacuate because of air raids.

Still another woman in an UNRRA nurse's uniform, who was accompanying a group of D.P.'s from North Africa to their homes in southern Europe, doubled as a fire fighter when a blaze broke out on the refugee ship. She saved the life of one child by plunging through a curtain of fire to an isolated cabin, treated badly burned women and calmed the passengers, while co-workers herded them into life boats. She was awarded a Soldier's Medal for heroism.

### A Bequest of Better Health

These UNRRA nurses, like the other technicians, were an integral part of its medical program. They, together with its emergency and long-range supplies, left a bequest of better health wherever they were at work.

Epidemic control supplies are stockpiled as insurance against future outbreaks. Many of the gaps left by looting and destruction and long years of no replacements have been filled in by large shipments of surgical instruments, of bed linens, of X-ray equipment and even of full hospital units and plants and raw materials for the manufacture of medical products. A few war-torn countries are now producing penicillin with UNRRA equipment and supplies.

A number of surveys were launched by UNRRA experts. Examples:

Tuberculosis—"Europe's number one infectious disease. Death rates double their prewar level. Striking most frequently at children. UNRRA mass-radiology for detection, and its sanatoria equipment and nourishing food have helped, but there is far from enough of anything."

Nutrition—"Years of underfeeding is reflected in the reduced body weights of both adults and children, and in the failure of normal growth in children. Some children are stunted three or four inches—a twelve year old looks like nine."

The published findings of some of the UNRRA surveys, both in medical and in other technical and scientific fields, have added to the general knowledge on each subject.

UNRRA supplemented its full-time medical services by sending special teaching missions into a number of countries. Notable among them were the series of faciomaillary surgery teams sent into Yugoslavia from London to demonstrate plastic surgery, and the teams of distinguished lecturers who brought the newer knowledge of the war years to the colleges and universities of Poland and Czechoslovakia under the joint auspices of the Unitarian Service Committee and UNRRA. A group of medical teachers was also sent into China to start a training program in cooperation with the National Institute of Health.

Beyond any question, public health and the medical professions were one of the greatest victors of the war and post-war period. UNRRA had a part in that victory. In every country in which UNRRA had a medical program, it left a bequest of advanced knowledge, equipment and pharmaceuticals, and of expanded and improved health facilities.

### Ploughshares for the Battlefields

While UNRRA was working with one hand to rush food into battleground countries, it was struggling with the other to help each land wrest more and more from its own soil. There was little to work with—at first.

The stern indispensables of farmers the world over—a horse, a cow, a plough, seeds, fertilizers—had almost disappeared.

Livestock had been driven away in herds, had been eaten, had perished. Farm implements had been beaten into weapons; those that couldn't be carted away were worn out or rusted. Nowhere was there enough of the right kind of seeds to plant. Weeds stood high in many fields, and fertilizers for long-neglected soil were almost non-existent.


Men, women and children went out that first spring after the shooting stopped in Europe to scratch at the bare earth with sticks, or to hitch themselves to the few ploughs that were left. But willpower and sweat alone were not enough. And the less food produced in a country, the more UNRRA would have to import.

To help hungry countries produce more of their own food  
UNRRA sent . . .



*mechanical equipment . . .*

*livestock . . .*



UNRRA set out, therefore, in its agricultural rehabilitation program to give indigenous production as large a lift as possible toward pre-war levels. The supplies it sent included everything to plant, cultivate, harvest, and even to pack and preserve crops. There were farm tractors, reapers and binders; chemicals to kill crop-destroying insects and to fight plant and animal diseases; tons and tons of seeds matched to the climates in which they would grow; horses and mules and heifers and bulls and even baby chicks and hatching eggs; hand tools by the thousands—hoes and rakes, sickles and scythes.

**It is estimated that UNRRA supplies and experts put about twenty-five million acres back into production.**

#### IN NOAH'S FOOTSTEPS

The livestock shipments might be called the most important waterborne migration of animals since the time of Noah. It was a costly and hazardous operation, but draft animals were absolutely essential to any real measure of agricultural rehabilitation.

The UNRRA livestock fleet was composed of some seventy-two vessels, complete with stalls, special ventilation and maternity wards. It carried more than 300,000 farm animals overseas, 2,500 of them contributed by voluntary organizations and individuals. Several thousand U. S. farmers and farm boys, recruited and assembled by the Brethren Service Committee, sailed as livestock handlers. Trained veterinarians in each country gave instructions on controlled breeding, and, with luck, it is hoped that the farm animal census in the assisted countries will climb back to its customary total in about ten or twelve years.

In many localities the fastest way to get the crops in the ground was to use mechanized equipment. A single tractor landed and put to work in the spring meant bread for a thousand people that fall. So UNRRA sent in not only thousands of tractors, plows, disk harrows and other tractor-drawn equipment, but technicians to demonstrate their use. Tractor schools were set up and trained instructors sent out into the fields.

The tractors were often used in teams of twenty, moving from community to community to prepare individual

plots for seeding. Rigged up with lights and operated in shifts, they worked around the clock in planting time. Efficient local operators and mobile repair shops are now in the UNRRA countries to keep farm machinery in top operating condition in the years to come.

On farms that had been out of production for many years, insects had practically taken over. UNRRA pesticides increased and protected the after-the-war yield. In several instances, there would have been no harvest without them.

In Sardinia, for example, a great army of grain-destroying locusts advanced on a bountiful wheat crop. Locusts are an ancient curse in the Mediterranean area. Farmers once fought them by beating gongs and clashing cymbals to frighten them away. UNRRA had other ideas. Gasoline flame throwers and jeeps, trucks and a new chemical, gammexane, were quickly concentrated in Sardinia and put into systematic use. The locusts were routed; the grain saved.

Another swift way of getting food to people was to harvest it from the sea. Many native fishing boats had been commandeered by the military. Trained fishermen had gone off into other pursuits. In several European countries, and in China, UNRRA assisted in rehabilitating fishing industries from catch to can. A whole fleet of modern deep-water fishing vessels, along with hand-picked fishermen who could remain in a country to show how to use the new gear, were sailed across the Pacific, across the Atlantic, and up from Australia. In addition, UNRRA sent in boat-building and repair materials, fish-hooks, twine, cotton netting, cork, and equipment for refrigerating and processing the catch.

### Up From Zero

UNRRA's industrial rehabilitation program had to start almost from zero. What was not worn out was wrecked.

Ports were partly or wholly unfit for handling ships or cargoes. Roadsteads spawned floating mines, and miles of dock had vanished, together with cranes and all the other paraphernalia for loading and unloading. Whole cities were without water, lights, sewage disposal or

communications. Bridges were out, roads were bomb-pocked and railroads a shambles of twisted metal. Europe's power potential had fallen to a nineteenth century level.

The main purposes of UNRRA's rehabilitation efforts—all aimed at self-help—were three: To get enough of the wheels of transportation turning again so relief supplies could be delivered to all parts of a country; to provide coal, and to a lesser extent, gasoline and lubricants, to power transport, public utilities and key industries; and to send in material and equipment for those industries so they could begin to produce some of the goods the people needed.

Industrial rehabilitation was the largest UNRRA program in tonnage, the second largest in dollar value, and represented an about-face from post-World War I planning when boatload after boatload of finished goods was poured into Europe, draining off its foreign exchange.

These were some of its high spots:

All types of vehicles—freight cars, locomotives, and barges, together with spare parts and fuel—bought promptly from the military at the end of the war and actually in use during that critical winter of 1945-46. Thousands of others arrived later to make a grand total of 660 locomotives, 12,000 freight cars and 83,000 trucks.

Water, sewage and gas systems repaired in time to be a strong right arm in the battle against epidemics.

The lights turned on in some shattered towns for the first time in many, many years.

Heavy industry humming again with UNRRA lathes, milling machines, pneumatic tools, and raw materials.


Coal, the keystone of European recovery, now coming out of Polish and Czechoslovakian pits in large enough quantities for export—pits put in running order again with UNRRA machinery.

Enough baled raw cotton turning on the spindles of repaired textile mills in Europe and China to make two and one-half billion yards of goods.


And though basic economies were by no means restored in any receiving country, communications and vital industries are now meeting some of the most essential requirements.

To start the wheels of transportation turning again  
UNRRA PROVIDED . . .

*trucks . . .*



*locomotives . . .*



## TALES OF HIGH ADVENTURE

The industrial rehabilitation files tell tales of high adventure in storied lands . . .

The rolling stock which the army had been using to move Lend-Lease supplies across the mountains and deserts of Iran to Russia was picked up in knock-down condition and moved 8,000 miles to China where it was assembled and put in running order.

An UNRRA salvage expert reclaimed practically all of the cargo of a supply ship which sank after hitting a mine in the Adriatic. He had no modern equipment, only empty barrels and drums for the flotation. His work crew consisted of native fishermen and off-job men.

The occupying Germans had drawn the water from Athens' uncompleted Marathon Dam system down below the danger point. It would have taken a year or more for the water level to rise again, so UNRRA engineers developed new wells and piped fresh water into the reservoir. Soon Athenians were getting supplies in excess of five gallons a day for each person.

The largest single rehabilitation job was repairing the breach in the Yellow River in China. In an effort to stem the Japanese advance in 1938, the Chinese High Command made a breach in the dike and flooded western Honan. Subsequently, the breach was widened to a full mile, and the uncurbed waters of the Yellow River spread across 23,000 square miles with a normal population of four million people.

After numerous delays, UNRRA restored the breach and repaired the river banks in March, 1947. The former flooded areas are now ready for rehabilitation, and UNRRA mechanized equipment will save several years in putting them back into shape to start producing again.

These and other stories make the rehabilitation files more than a musty record of dollars spent and tons delivered. They underline again the technical skill and the steady perseverance of the men and women who went out for UNRRA to direct the patching-up process in the devastated lands.

And they show the considerable extent to which the supplies and assistance provided by the relief and reha-

bilitation agency helped stave off economic chaos in each country in which they were poured and gave that country something to work with in the long pull ahead.

### **Yeast for the Future**

Another UNRRA self-help measure was its Fellowship program. Though UNRRA specialists taught and counseled steadily as they worked, they could not begin to train enough people to carry on efficiently even the rehabilitation projects they had started. So 125 carefully chosen professional men and women were brought to the United States from the battleground countries to catch up on scientific and technical advances made in their fields during the war years. In addition, thirty-one fellows were sent to various European countries, most of them to Great Britain, but a few to Sweden, France and Switzerland.

The UNRRA Fellowship Division planned three to six month courses for the specialists in one of six major fields: Agricultural Rehabilitation, Finance, Health, Industrial Rehabilitation, Medical and Sanitation Supplies, and Welfare.

The fellows crammed in study and travel during their short stay. Many took courses at universities. Others did research in laboratories, and visited and studied and observed at experimental stations, in factories and on farms, in welfare institutions, in hospitals and clinics, and in many departments of government.

They are now back in their home countries—teaching, directing research, and helping reorganize institutions and programs. They might be called the yeast among the ingredients for rehabilitation in lands where the job ahead still looms dishearteningly large.

### **The Desperate People**

During the war millions of men, women and children were uprooted from their firesides and scattered like chaff across three continents. Some were only a few towns distant from their homes; others were half way round the world.

In 1945 it was estimated that there were in Germany alone, more than eight million displaced persons, most of

them Nazi labor slaves. Thousands could be found in Austria, Italy, the Middle East, the Far East, and even in the Western Hemisphere.

Caring for, repatriating and resettling these people has been one of the most ticklish and tragic of post-war problems. The great majority wanted to go home, and lacked only the means of getting there. But some have not wished to return to their native countries because they feared political persecution. Others consider themselves stateless. This "hard-core" of D.P.'s who have nowhere to go have indeed become the world's most desperate people.

UNRRA had a large hand in post-war refugee work. It was originally authorized to care for and assist in the repatriation of former United Nations nationals and stateless persons. Its scope was later extended to include others, among them Italian nationals displaced within their own country as a result of war. Specifically excluded from UNRRA care were prisoners of war, and persons of any nationality "who have been determined by the military authorities to have collaborated with the enemy or to have committed crimes against the interests of nationals of the United Nations."

UNRRA's first D.P. task was in the Middle East, where, in May, 1944, it assumed full responsibility for six camps and about 40,000 refugees, mainly Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Dodecanese Islanders. Among these people were the wives and children of the Partisans who fought the enemy more courageously in the knowledge that their relatives were safe. There was a preponderance of old men, old women and disabled soldiers in the group.

For over a year, under a blazing sun, and primarily in tent camps, UNRRA fed and cared for these people until ships could be rounded up and they could be offered repatriation. The handicaps were overwhelming: sketchy sanitary facilities, make-shift hospitals and kitchens, and shortages of everything. UNRRA set up health, educational, welfare and recreational services, and introduced a system of self-government.

Most of the refugees chose to return to their own countries at the first opportunity, and from its Middle East office UNRRA repatriated a total of 50,000 people, some of them coming

To the displaced persons—the world's most tragic people—  
UNRRA MEANT . . .



*friendship and care . . .*

*repatriation, if they  
wished it . . .*



*and, for many scattered  
families, --  
reunion . . .*

from as far afield as Tanganyika and the Belgian Congo, and all of them accompanied by UNRRA welfare and medical officers.

#### D.P.'S IN GERMANY

In Germany, UNRRA spearhead teams and flying squads were at work even before V-E Day, assisting the Allied military authorities with the millions of men, women and children who were trudging up and down highways and byways, or crushed into assembly centers and transit camps.

There was almost no limit to the duties—or the endurance—of these early teams. They directed the universal dusting with DDT powder (which the D.P.'s called their "sleeping powder" because it gave them uninterrupted rest), presided at births and deaths and marriages, and comforted and cheered in many languages.

With the dissolution of SHAEF, and the increase in UNRRA personnel, UNRRA and the military authorities negotiated agreements for the French, British and U.S. Zones of Germany, under which UNRRA gradually took over the internal management of the assembly centers and camps, while the military authorities continued to be responsible for furnishing shelter, food and other basic supplies.

In addition, the agreements staked out UNRRA's other responsibilities: To coordinate and supervise the work of the voluntary agencies among the D.P.'s (and very extensive and important work it was); to operate a Central Tracing Bureau to reunite scattered families; to provide amenity supplies such as cigarettes, toilet articles and recreation equipment; and finally, to cooperate with the military and government authorities in arranging repatriation of the D.P.'s, including their reception in their home countries.

The assembly centers and camps in which UNRRA took on this large assignment varied in character and in population. Shelter and sanitation ranged from the primitive to a reasonable degree of comfort, but more often than not, quarters had to be patched up and made livable with little but bare hands and ingenuity. It was

necessary to place some D.P.'s immediately in hospitals for treatment for over-work or severe malnourishment; others had been so driven by their former Nazi "employers" that for many months work was a humiliation, rather than a normal activity in which they were anxious to join.

To thousands, however, liberation was a spur to action. Once an assembly center was habitable, UNRRA concentrated on making it a going concern with everybody given a part.

Camp committees were initiated for general and specific activities, all subject to the advice and control of the UNRRA team in charge. Camp newspapers, canteens, Boy and Girl Scout groups, and orchestras and dramatic shows soon cropped up.

Almost every center had its sewing rooms, and its machine and carpentry and woodworking and cobbler's shops where clothing and other useful objects were made from German uniforms, from unraveled rope, from former Nazi flags, from pieces of parachute and airplane fabrics and other scrounged materials. One center built up a complete boot shop and another a soap factory.

Aside from producing badly-needed goods, these shops gave vocational training to many people. Later, through an over-all employment program inaugurated by UNRRA in 1946, many D.P.'s awaiting repatriation were placed in jobs approved by the military authorities outside of the camps.

Meanwhile, UNRRA and voluntary agency technicians provided the camps with many of the services of a well-run community. Clinics and day nurseries were established. Nutritionists advised on the best use of the food supplies. Some people had dental care for the first time in their lives. Serious epidemics were caught before they got a head start. And, as a result, the general standards of health among the D.P.'s remained remarkably good.

#### SPECIAL CARE FOR CHILDREN

Care and consideration for children—always war's most tragic victims—was underscored by UNRRA in the D.P. operation. Thousands of youngsters turned up

among the masses of human beings who sought shelter. The luckier ones still clung to some member of their family. But many others were the so-called "unaccompanied children" who often knew neither their nationality nor their name.

Some of them had spent most of their short, disordered lives in Belsen, Dachau, or one of the other horror camps, branded and beaten and driven mercilessly. Not a few had seen their parents killed before their eyes.

They had come out of their experience timid, possessive, frightened—or hard and arrogant. What more could happen to them? They'd had it. Almost all were dirty and malnourished and ragged.

To give these children the physical and psychological care they so desperately needed, special children's centers were established in the most livable and pleasant quarters available. There the children were given proper food, medicines, schooling, vocational training—and slowly taught to laugh and play again.

The number of children in these special centers—which totaled about 10,000—was soon swelled by thousands of other United Nations children who had been stolen and absorbed into German homes and who were located by UNRRA search teams.

#### UNRRA'S REPATRIATION STAND

Arrangements were made for repatriation when, and if, the nationality of these children could be determined after long hours of patient exploration by welfare officers. Many of them were reunited with their families through the machinery of UNRRA's Central Tracing Bureau, whose mass tracing activities rewove the tangled lives of thousands of victims of Nazi aggression, and wrote a great drama of reunion in Europe.

In the regular D.P. camps and centers children were also given special care through clinics, schools and playgrounds. The schools were all staffed and directed by D.P.'s. Books were almost non-existent, but UNRRA solved that problem by having some printed, with their texts approved by the governments concerned. In Munich, an UNRRA university had a student body of 2,000.

During all of the months UNRRA was in charge of camp management, the agency consistently urged volun-

For all children—both those in D. P. camps and in war-devastated countries—UNRRA PROVIDED . . .



*special food . . .*

*and special care.*



tary repatriation for those who were not in conflict with the government of their own country. UNRRA's information—and there was a great deal of it—indicated that those who had already returned home were well treated. **Not one single instance of mistreatment of a returned refugee was ever substantiated.**

UNRRA's argument was this: Any D.P., who was not in political conflict with his government, was better off working on his own soil for the rehabilitation of his homeland than he was sitting in any D.P. camp anywhere, his spirits and skills deteriorating with each passing month.

The great majority of displaced persons in Germany were repatriated in the first five months after V-E Day when more than five million people returned to their homes. In the next five months, almost 300,000 more set out. Then repatriation began to decrease steadily, pushed down by factors obviously beyond the control of the military authorities and UNRRA.

In the summer of 1946, a sixty-day ration plan was inaugurated, under which the military authorities agreed to turn over a free issue of sixty days' rations to UNRRA for each displaced Polish national who returned to Poland, and UNRRA agreed to ship the rations to Polish reception points, and supervise their issuance. More than 94,000 D.P.'s returned to Poland from Germany and Austria under this plan. A similar drive the following spring was not as successful.

When UNRRA turned the D.P. camps in Germany over to the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization in June, 1947, the camp populations stood at 558,851. Very few of those still left in them wanted to return to their homelands, and resettlement in other lands seemed the only answer.

#### D.P.'S AROUND THE WORLD

UNRRA's D.P. programs in Austria and Italy were patterned after that in Germany, though on a smaller scale. The camps were organized in much the same way and UNRRA performed essentially the same services. In Italy the problem of returning to their homes thousands of Italians who had fled cross-fire and bombings increased the size of the job.

In the Far East the D.P. program assumed enormous proportions: The European refugees were a long boat trip from their homelands. Chinese refugees were dispersed throughout southwest Asia, and millions upon millions of men, women and children had been driven from their homes within China's borders during the long years of fighting.

Some 15,000 European refugees, mostly Jews who had fled to escape political persecution, received UNRRA care in China, and a substantial proportion of them were repatriated. About 20,000 overseas Chinese were returned to their before-the-war places of residence, and many others given care.

### Out of Private Pockets

The steady and healing flow of goods and services which the world has sent into broken lands since the war's end has come in the most part from public funds—that is, funds voted, with the approval of the people, by their legislative bodies. UNRRA was the largest of these public relief efforts in the immediate post-war years.

But the men, women, and the children, too, of many countries have dug down deep into their own pockets, and have gone into their clothes closets and barns and bins to make additional voluntary contributions. These contributions have enabled an impressive number of private and religious agencies to give material and moral aid which has been, on the heels of history's most fiendish war, a magnificent and heartening example of man's humanity to man.

In the UNRRA-assisted countries, and in the camps for displaced persons, representatives of the voluntary agencies worked under the UNRRA banner, and gave the organization strong and effective support.

There were over 100 private agencies cooperating with UNRRA, the majority of them with home bases in the United States and Great Britain. But most of the countries of the world were represented in some way.

Several major councils were set up which formed a point of contact, and greatly simplified the work: The American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign

Services; the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad; and the Councils for Canada, Australia and others that had similar titles and purposes.

Some forty voluntary agencies, and 1432 experts whom they employed, worked with UNRRA in the camps for displaced persons. Hundreds of others were attached to the various Missions.

With equipment often supplied by their agencies, these experts conducted nutritional surveys and clinics, gave immigration assistance, went out into the fields to advise farmers how to increase their crops and run their new tractors, organized and ran children's feeding centers and summer camps, conducted medical teaching missions, distributed morale supplies not included in UNRRA shipments, and in many other ways lifted the health and courage of the people among whom they worked.

Their special contributions included such items as these: A fleet of jeeps to distribute supplies; hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of chocolate milk, which many war-born children had never tasted; herds of livestock to replace those depleted by hunger and battle; traditional wines and foods for men and women who had not celebrated Passover openly for many years; beds and linens and medicines for hospitals; and, of course, tons and tons of food and clothing.

It was in the UNRRA-sponsored Victory and United National Clothing Collections that the volunteer agencies gave some of their most important assistance. They helped gather in the more than 200 million pounds of shoes and suits and overcoats and dresses that poured into collection centers during the drives, and were a quick channel of distribution in war-torn areas, both in the UNRRA and non-UNRRA countries.

### Aftermath

At the Fifth Council Session in Geneva in August, 1946, the United States and the United Kingdom, the two largest supplying nations, took the position that it was time to bring the activities of UNRRA to a close.

The gist of their reasoning:

Most liberated countries had functioning governments. They could procure and ship supplies better than an in-

ternational organization. Countries short of foreign exchange could turn to the International Bank and Monetary Fund. To the extent that assistance was not supplied by the Bank and the Fund, the proper solution was for a needy country to apply, on an individual basis, to another country which was able and prepared to help.

Thus, future relief efforts were placed on a bi-lateral, rather than an international, basis.

Just as it took some time to wind up for action as vast an organization as UNRRA, it likewise took some time to run it down. UNRRA's Health Division went out of business on January 1, 1947, its Displaced Persons Division six months later. The European Missions closed their doors in June, 1947, and its Far Eastern Missions at the end of that year.

As UNRRA bowed out, other international organizations picked up important phases of its work, all with the aid of substantial bequests from UNRRA residual funds, and some of UNRRA's trained personnel.

The Interim Commission of the World Health Organization took over certain aspects of the UNRRA health program, including advising and assisting in the control of malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases, and training health personnel. UNRRA financial assistance: Up to \$3,000,000.

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization assumed the direction of a number of technical and advisory services initiated by UNRRA to increase food production. UNRRA aid: \$1,350,000.

The Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization assumed responsibility for all UNRRA displaced persons activities. To keep the camps going until PCIRO funds were available, UNRRA loaned the fledgling agency \$2,000,000 and transferred \$1,000,000 from its residual assets.

The International Children's Emergency Fund, which was an outgrowth of an UNRRA Council resolution, has so far received a total of \$11,100,000 from UNRRA's unspent funds. At its peak UNRRA was providing an extra meal a day for ten million children. By the end of 1947, ICÉF announced it was reaching about three and one-half million European children a day, and planned aid to at least 700,000 Chinese children.

Late in 1947 the Chinese government established a Board of Trustees, including foreign as well as Chinese nationals as members, to carry forward millions of dollars' worth of long-range rehabilitation projects in China after UNRRA's departure. These projects, which are expected to be of vital significance to China's economy in the years ahead, include rehabilitation of its fishing industry, setting up plans for the production of pharmaceutical supplies, its Yellow River project, and numerous activities intended to modernize Chinese agriculture.

The plan calls for the active direction of the projects by a newly created Chinese Rehabilitation Commission. The Board of Trustees, which would hold in trust the long-term equipment, the funds resulting from the sale of UNRRA goods in China, and five million dollars transferred to the Board by UNRRA, will serve in an advisory capacity to the Rehabilitation Commission but will exercise financial control of all UNRRA residual assets allocated for the support of the projects. It is contemplated that the projects will be turned over to private industry after they get a good start.

### Thank You, UNRRA

This, then, is the story of the life and times of UNRRA, the first great international relief and rehabilitation organization. It was in existence slightly over four years—two of them in full action.

In the supplying countries UNRRA will soon be little more than a huge set of books, and pages and pages of technical reports and grey statistics.

But UNRRA is far more than a tall column of figures in the lands which received its aid. A *New York Times* correspondent, returned from a trip across Europe in the long, cold, hard winter of 1946-47—the longest and coldest and hardest winter of a century—wrote:

“To the occupied countries UNRRA became a holy word, and often meant the difference between life and death.”

There aren't many ways in which people and countries can shout gratitude across an ocean. The receiving governments have, of course, sent their official thanks to

UNRRA. Thousands of individuals have written letters to its Missions, or thanked its staff members in person or with some tiny, token gift.

In Poland, a monument to UNRRA has been unveiled. Czechoslovakia has named a college in its memory. Children, and horses and cows, too, are called "UNRRA". There have been UNRRA parades and UNRRA exhibits.

In the interior of China, even after men and women in uniforms with red UNRRA flashes on their sleeves had been familiar sights for months, they could not appear on the streets or ride out in an UNRRA jeep without having the peasants line up along side the road to cheer.

But one of the most eloquent expressions of what UNRRA meant to the people is contained in this brief communication to the editor of a Czechoslovakian paper, intended only for the eyes of other townsmen:

"The whole town is affected with a fever. We are studying hard the clippings in the paper which list the UNRRA goods on ration points.

"Do you feel the blood running to your head? We can get crackers and sardines and dried evaporated milk and cheddar cheese and meat with vegetables and so on and so on.

"The grocer is a very tired man indeed. From morning until night he has chattering housewives around him, one waiting to see what the other is going to take, all weighing the value of one thing against another.

"We all become children seeing these UNRRA parcels in solid and nice wrappings. They mean peace! A peace we are enjoying in small doses, but even those doses are exciting to us. We are children, barefooted and out at the elbows, and suddenly we see before us a rich display. We are standing around with a finger in our mouth and we are looking at it in wonder—and in gratitude."



## 48 Member Governments of UNRRA

Australia	Iran
Belgium	Iraq
Bolivia	Liberia
Brazil	Luxembourg
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	Mexico
Canada	Netherlands
Chile	New Zealand
China	Nicaragua
Colombia	Norway
Costa Rica	Panama
Cuba	Paraguay
Czechoslovakia	Peru
Denmark	Philippine Commonwealth
Dominican Republic	Poland
Ecuador	Turkey
Egypt	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
El Salvador	Union of South Africa
Ethiopia	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
France	United Kingdom
Greece	United States of America
Guatemala	Uruguay
Haiti	Venezuela
Honduras	Yugoslavia
Iceland	
India	

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UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FEBRUARY 15, 1948

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41 EAST 57<sup>TH</sup> STREET  
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February 1, 1948

SUITE 2704  
ELDORADO 5-1182

Major General Lowell W. Rooks  
Director General, UNRRA  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Rooks:

I have read the proof of "The Story of UNRRA" with great interest and satisfaction. It recites very simply the story of the greatest and most successful international organization of its kind in the history of the world. It describes graphically what UNRRA did to prevent wide-spread starvation, to curb sweeping epidemics, and to avert economic collapse in many countries.

UNRRA provided not only food, medicines, clothing and shelter, but laid the groundwork for economic recovery in many areas of Europe and Asia. It worked at a time when the world was in chaos. It had to struggle against a shortage of supplies, funds and manpower; but in time it overcame most of its obstacles. UNRRA was the only thing that saved many millions of people in Europe and Asia from starvation, fatal disorder and black despair.

I had the honor of serving as first Director General of UNRRA from 1943 to 1946, and I shall always look back with the deepest satisfaction on the part which I was privileged to play in this greatest of all relief and rehabilitation undertakings. With the support of an unusually loyal and efficient organization in this country and abroad, we set up an organization which in more than a score of countries carried on a wide-flung program to save millions of men, women and children from starvation and to bring new hope into their lives. I am deeply grateful to the fine men and women with whom I worked over these years. Some of them gave their lives in the service of UNRRA; almost all of them made great sacrifices. I am happy, too, that when I felt it necessary to step down as the first Director General, I was succeeded by two such able and devoted administrators as Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia and yourself. Since January 1947, you have carried on the work with singular devotion and success.

UNRRA will have its place in history as proof that nations and peoples can live together and work together to achieve a high purpose. I hope that it will serve as an example to the many other international organizations that succeed it.

Very sincerely yours,

Herbert H. Lehman

## UNRRA Supply Program

(as of 30 Sept. 1947)

CATEGORY	VALUE	LONG TONS
Food	\$1,242,846,000	8,952,804
Clothing, Textiles and Footwear	436,590,000	607,050
Medical and Sanitation	108,392,000	105,308
Agricultural Rehabilitation	315,341,000	2,277,721
Industrial Rehabilitation	629,816,000	11,266,350
Unclassified	8,785,000	33,472
Other Supplies, mostly from Military Surpluses (food, clothing, medical supplies, trucks, etc.)	116,097,000	610,110

## UNRRA Assisted Countries

(as of 30 Sept. 1947)

COUNTRIES ASSISTED	VALUE	LONG TONS
Albania	25,803,000	134,892
Austria	135,172,000	1,101,118
Byelorussian S. S. R.	60,440,000	133,244
China	490,827,000	2,372,581
Czechoslovakia	260,339,000	1,532,273
*Dodecanese Islands	4,028,000	33,680
Ethiopia	625,000	1,699
*Finland	2,422,000	7,646
Greece	346,726,000	2,877,791
*Hungary	4,413,000	19,056
Italy	417,410,000	10,264,721
*Korea	916,000	6,322
*Philippines	9,887,000	36,095
Poland	471,300,000	2,211,539
*Republic of San Marino	30,000	214
Ukrainian S. S. R.	188,302,000	434,093
Yugoslavia	407,152,000	2,539,137

\* Programs of limited emergency aid.

